The great deception

This bit of news really floored me. I do not know whether to call it a bloomer or a case of ignorant vigilance. Perhaps it is like the proverbial glass that is half empty to the host and half full to the guest. Skeptics may think it to be a case of utter foolishness, but let us first see what happened and then give judgment.

Lance Naik Sheminderpal Singh of Indian army was posted at point 4715 near Thakung in Eastern Ladakh as a sentry/observer, overlooking the Line of Control between India and China at a height of about 4,715 metres above sea level (more than 13000 feet), near Pangong Tso, a high-altitude lake shared by India and Tibet.

In August 2012, lance Naik Singh sighted a strange and bright object crossing over the Line of control from the east around 6PM and remained visible throughout the night up to 5AM. He saw another object crossing the LAC around 4AM and remained visible till 11AM. There are simmering concerns within India army about cross-border transgressions and the use of unmanned aerial vehicles by the Chinese to look into Indian territory and all the soldiers have been asked to watch carefully for any cross border transgression by the Chinese. The soldier promptly reported the sighting to his senior holding a rank of Subedar major, a junior commissioned officer, who must have asked him to continue his observation.

In all, army personnel documented 329 sightings of the unidentified objects, until February 2013, seen over Thakung. Eventually, Lance Naik Singh's prompt observation reports, slowly reached the upper echelons of Indian army winding its way through a series of officers of various ranks. The army headquarters, already gripped with issues concerning Chinese incursions in sensitive Eastern Ladakh, took note of the reports and decided to call the Indian Institute of Astrophysics, Bangalore, who promptly deputed two astronomers to Ladakh earlier this year to resolve the mystery of the two objects that the army had been observing in the sensitive border zone since August 2012.

One of the two astronomers, Tushar Prabhu says: "Our task was to determine whether these unidentified objects were celestial or terrestrial." The two astronomers interviewed army Lance Naik Singh. Who told them that he had noticed a delay of four minutes in the appearance of one of the objects each consecutive day. He also told them that the object seemed to be the brightest light in the sky and always appeared to move with respect to the stars. Astronomers then asked the army to use a theodolite to record the horizontal angle and vertical elevation of the two objects. Army personnel performed these observations between February 17 and 22, 2013 and submitted the data to the astronomers.

After analysis, the astronomers came to the conclusion that the first object observed from Point 4715 has to be planet Jupiter as observations exactly matched with the planet’s diurnal motion and the apparent motion of the object due to the rotation of the Earth. The second unidentified object that appeared early in the morning is planet Venus, which is currently moving behind the Sun and will in the coming months appear as an evening object. The army observers were erroneously considering these two celestial objects as unmanned aerial vehicles.

As I read this story, I instantly remembered that one night in July, which I had spent in a tent just on the shores of the lake “Pangong Tso” near Line of Actual control in eastern Ladakh. After dinner, as I was returning to my tent, in almost freezing conditions, I just happened to look above at the sky. The sky was clear and was just sparkling and dazzling with brilliance of starlight coming from billions of stars above in the heavens. Much more significant from this was the fact that the stars appeared to be hanging so low that I imagined that they could be reached easily by an aircraft. In fact I clearly remember the Big Dipper constellation stars hanging very low and of big size.

After returning from Ladakh, I found out that this deception of seeing the stars big, bright and very low is due to increased atmospheric transparency observed at the high altitudes. So, there was nothing foolish, when Lance Naik Singh, mistook the two planets for UAV's moving in from east, across line of actual control. Both Indian and Chinese armies have been increasingly using pilotless aircraft with sensors and high-resolution cameras to watch each other across the border. In the last three years, the number of such transgressions are reported to be spiraling. Transgressions are not only over land but also in airspace. Against this background, sensitivities of the two sides and their armies/border police are extremely high.

I would therefore consider Lance Naik Singh's watchful observations as something for which he should be commended and not laughed at. I have many a times mistaken a distant aircraft at night to be a planet first, only to realize later that it is moving much faster and must be an aircraft. Therefor there is nothing silly in Lance Naik Singh's sharp observations. It is far better to be being over cautious and over react and be on guard on the line of control in Ladakh, than showing carelessness and casual approach. Lance Naik Singh and his superiors deserve a pat on their backs.

29 July 2013

Indian Army gives new eyes to the soldiers

In the modern warfare it is no longer sufficient just to have a sharp shooter or a sniper to create a decisive swing in a battle. Many new devices have been evolved to aid the infantry soldier such as thermal imagers for night vision and GPS or Global positioning system to pin point the location of the target or a laser range finder. The new trend is now to equip a soldier with a a hand-held, lightweight, fully integrated multi-function system (IMFS), which allows the user to detect, recognize, identify and locate targets. Such a system enables the soldier to effectively carry out the surveillance and also engage the targets with speed.

Instruments Research and Development Establishment (IRDE), Dehra Dun, India. Is involved with design and development of state-of-the-art night vision devices and thermal imagers, compact laser-based instruments, integrated electro-optical surveillance and fire control systems. The Indian Army has now placed orders worth 7 Billion Rupees for a new Integrated Multi-function sight developed by them. This device or IMFS is actually a combination of several such devices amalgamated together. It consists of a thermal imager, a laser range-finder, colour charge-coupled-device (CCD) camera, a global positioning system (GPS) and a digital magnetic compass.

The laser range-finder computes the location or co-ordinates of a target by sending a laser beam to the target. The thermal imager gives the device a night-vision capability. The CCD camera is like a normal digital imaging camera to take such images of the targets. The GPS or Global positioning system enables the soldier to exactly locate the position of the target on a map. This device capable of performing multiple tasks just weighs 3.5 Kg and is about 300 mm long and can be easily carried.

Some of the application where this device can be used include, Infantry Fire Control, Target Detection and Recognition, Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Force Protection and Homeland Security.

This device shall certainly provide much sharper eyes to the soldiers.

14 November 2012

Small Men of 1962 Part II

(Continued from)

India's northeastern border with Tibet, being a natural geographical border formed along series of snow clad Himalayan peaks, can be crossed only through few natural mountain passes on the mountain ridges or by walking along the foot ways formed on the narrow banks in the basins of three or four torrential rivers, that cross this natural border. Because of this natural protection and also considering the fact, that there was absolutely no border dispute of any kind till 1959, between India and Tibet, British India Government had never taken any military steps to safe guard this border. Few border posts near the mountain passes and the river beds were established by British India Government to secure these places. This policy was continued by Independent India under premiership of Nehru. Since there were no roads in this region, most of these frontier posts in the NEFA region were maintained by airdrops of all essential provisions to Assam Rifles policemen, guarding these border posts till 1959.

In August 1959, in a surprise move, Chinese attacked Indian position at Longju in Subanseri sector. About 200 to 300 Chinese soldiers attacked few Assam Rifles Policemen guarding this post. There was a small number of policemen guarding this post and they defended this post for 2 days gallantly. After that, they had to withdraw in the interior. This had happened even prior to Kongka Pass incident, described by me earlier, that took place in east Ladakh, during October 1959. In November 1959, Chinese unilaterally declared that they no longer accept McMahon line as the agreed boundary between India and Tibet. It can be said that attack on Longju post was in a way a precursor for the things to come.

As a response to new Chinese postures, Indian Government had decided in 1959 itself, to increase number of army posts on the NEFA border,. It was also decided by the Government in Delhi to construct more foot ways, bridges and mule tracks along the border so that supplies can be reached to new military posts on the border in a faster time frame. However it took very long for the Government machinery to actually implement the policy decisions and construction began only in summer of 1962 though 34 new border posts were already set up nearer to McMahon line.

Even though new posts were established, no bridges, roads or mule tracks were ready till summer of 1962, which would have ensured that the supplies reach the posts in a quicker time span. Because of this reason, supplies were made to these forward posts by para dropping with help from Indian air force. A Chinese report mentions that most of the supplies never reached the men because of the extremely hilly region. Since the posts were not connected to each other by tracks or roads, they remained essentially isolated and were unable to provide cover to each other as is normally planned when setting up such posts. All these deficiencies were pointed out by the local commanders to Army HQ and then to concerned Government ministers. Unfortunately, these complaints fell on deaf ears as both prime minister Nehru and defense minister Krishna Menon were of the firm opinion that China would only continue with minor incursions and never would launch a full scale conflict. The advanced border posts now set up would be able to effectively handle and control any such Chinese incursions in future. 

 

Battle of Namka Chu

I have mentioned earlier that the McMahon line follows the Himalayan peaks all along the border. However, near the Tri-junction point of the borders of Bhutan, India and Tibet, there was a minor border dispute between India and China. A small river, which swells only during monsoons, flows from this Tri-junction point to east, between two mountain ridges known as Tsangdhar Ridge in the south of river and Thagla Ridge in the north of the river, till it confluences with Nyamjang Chu river. (Another small river). According to India's position, McMahon line passes along Thagla ridge from the Tri-junction point, to Nyamjang Chu river and then continues along Wadung ridge to Bum La, whereas Chinese maintained that the border passed along Tsangdhar Ridge to Nyamjang Chu river. The Namka Chu river valley is extremely narrow and large scale troupe movements are almost impossible here.

Out of the new posts set up in NEFA in 1959, one army post known as Dhola post, was set up on the southern bank of this Namka Chu river. Another post on the bank of Nyamjang Chu river further to north was also then set up at Khinzemane. Chinese soldiers had attacked this post in 1959 and had pushed Indians back from this post. Indians had reoccupied this post after Chinese had gone back and were holding it till 1962 Autumn.

In Agust-September 1962, Chinese army brought in their men in large numbers to the Thagla ridge area. Army sources reported to Delhi that about 400 Chinese were now positioned on Thagla ridge. Presence of Chinese in such large numbers was a direct threat to posts at Dhola and Khinzemane. After this news reached Delhi, Defense minister Krishna Menon suggested to Chief of Army staff, General Thapar that the Chinese on Thagla ridge should be immediately evicted from there. Knowing the ground realities well, General Thapar tried to argue with the defense minister about futility of any such major action in that narrow area. He was however told that considering the political pressure on Prime minister Nehru, this order has to be obeyed by the army.

Till September end, there were only incidences of minor skirmishes in Namka Chu valley with overall military situation fairly stable. However large number of Indian troupes descended in this area on orders from Delhi in next few days. This large scale arrival of Indian troupes in this narrow valley was hallmarked with total disarray, disorder, confusion and mismanagement not usually associated with a military movement on this scale. The soldiers did not have enough warm clothing, ordnance was in short supply. Troupes provided with mortar launchers had no mortars to launch. There was paucity of guns and being such a narrow valley and that to on the international border, para dropping was not feasible. After realizing the desperate situation of these new arrivals, the officer in charge of the operation, Maj.Gen Umrao Singh, bitterly complained to his seniors in Delhi. This resulted into a decision, which had direct bearings on the final outcome of the conflict. Maj.Gen Umarao Singh was abruptly transferred and in his place a comparatively inexperienced officer, Maj. Gen. B.M. Kaul was brought in as officer in command. In an most surprising decision Ma.Gen. Kaul was ordered to liaison directly with Prime minister Nehru and not through normal official channel of Army HQ or chief of army staff. It can be said that Chief of Army staff, General Thapar disassociated himself with the Namka Chu operation completely. In next fortnight, approximately 2500 Indian soldiers arrived in Namka Chu valley. The strategic battle plan prepared by Maj. Gen. B.M. Kaul has been discussed in many forums over the years, including some on the internet and there is unanimity of opinion that in the history, very rarely one may find, anything as disastrous as this.An excellent account of the battle can be read on this link.

The Chinese saw arrival of such large numbers of Indian soldiers in Namka Chu valley as a big danger sign and Chinese soldiers also started arriving in very large numbers. By 20^th October 1962, as many as 30000 Chinese soldiers arrived on Thagla ridge area. Only after their arrival, Maj. Gen. B.M.Kaul came to realization that he had brought such large numbers of his own soldiers in a death trap. However it was too late now. On 21^st October 1962 Chinese crossed Namka Chu river and captured all Indian positions on the south bank of the river. On 23^rd October 1962, Government in Beijing allowed PLA to cross McMahon line as and when required. Indian army soon realized that it was impossible to launch any counter offensives because enemy had all the advantages and they started retreating. Within next 5 days of massacre and debacle, India army was pushed back 10 miles to south of McMahon line to Lumpo.

Indian army units lost large numbers of soldiers in this close battle. Second Rajput lost 282 men out of 513 deployed. Gurakhas lost 80 men and 90 were captured. 493 soldiers of Seventh Brigade were killed in this battle. It is to the credit of the Indian soldiers that they fought with much bravery and gallantry under adverse conditions in which they were pushed. Chinese too, lost a huge number of men in this battle. Indian men, who had fought at Namka Chu received as many as 15 top gallantry awards later. From the number of these awards, it is possible to imagine the high moral and bravery of Indian soldiers with which they had fought this battle. A memorial for Namka Chu battle was later erected near Lumpo. However because of extreme weather conditions, it got damaged and finally a 40 feet tall proper and befitting war  memorial was erected in the town of Tawang in 1999.

A writer, Neville Maxwell writes in his book 'India’s China War' that if General Thapar would have resigned when ordered to evict Chinese from Thagla ridge, probably 1962 war might not have happened at all. I do not agree with this, because the basic aim of Chinese in 1962 war was to secure the Aksaichin road in Ladakh and they would have gone to any length and would have started this war later, if not at that point of time.

The defeat of Indian army in the battle of Namka Chu is considered as an extremely important event for any historical Military strategy study. The total failure of the Generals to take decisions after considering ground realities, mismanagement, WW II vintage arms, lack of warm clothing, unacclimatized troupes and extremely immature political leadership, are some of the reasons that brought in such a big defeat with loss of hundreds of brave soldiers and officers. Regretfully, I have to say that the gates of NEFA were opened to China because of this unnecessary war on a totally wrong kind of battlefield.

The battle strategy plan envisaged by Maj. Gen. B.M.Kaul for Namka Chu, had no provision of a defensive front at the rear of the McMahon line, in case the front line soldiers were defeated due to some reason and had to fall back. Perhaps in the undue haste with which soldiers were sent to Namka Chu, this fact was never thought or planned and no reserve force was kept at the rear. With all positions of the army near Thagla ridge now overtaken by Chinese, and Indian army retreating and running away from the battle zone, there were no forces left for protection of Tawang town any more.

( To be concluded)

22 October 2012

Small men of 1962 -Part I

In the previous series of articles, we saw the background and reasons of the total and extensive defeat in East Ladakh, inflicted on India by Chinese in 1962. Actually, this war was fought on two fronts, which were physically separated by thousands of miles. Besides Ladakh, another important front, where this war was also fought, was opened in Arunachal Pradesh, located in North East corner of India. In east Ladakh, China and India had a dispute regarding territory of Aksaichin and the war there, was mainly fought over that issue. As against that, except for a very minor dispute regarding few border posts, there was no such standing dispute existing in Arunachal Pradesh (It was known as Northeast frontier agency or NEFA then.) at that time. Any student of history would realize even after a brief study, that China had raised this dispute in Arunachal Pradesh, so that when eventual negotiations would open about Aksaichin in east Ladakh, it would appear to observers, that China was ready for give and take. The steps taken by China in this regard, were planned and executed very carefully. Let us first consider certain political developments that took place before the war. 

 

 

We saw earlier that the border between Tibet and India was demarcated in a tripartite meeting between representatives of British India, Tibet and China in 1914 held in Shimla. The border in NEFA or Arunachal Pradesh was finalized later, when a British officer, Captain Bailey had carried out an extensive survey of the region. A map showing this border line on a map was later attached to the draft of the treaty. This line became known after the name of the British representative who had participated in the meeting, as McMahon line. A special feature of this line was that for 95% of the region, this line followed a clear line of geographical features such as tops of mountain ranges. This line begins in the east from the 15283 feet high Hkakabo Razi mountain peak known as on the Tri-junction point of the borders of India, Tibet and Myanmar, about 18 Km north of the Diphu pass. From here it crosses the Lohit river basin and follows the mountain peaks along Gangri- Karpo pass- Yongqyap pass- Tunga pass to Bum pass north of the town of Tawang in the west. From here it goes along Zanglung ridge and ThagLa Ridge to meet another Tri Junction point on borders of Tibet, India and Bhutan. Even when we take a look on this border on a map, it becomes immediately clear that this is a natural geographical frontier between two countries.

Majority areas in this region are unreachable and impassable with high peaks of towering heights to 5000 Meters, deep valleys, thick forests and heavy uncontrolled torrential rivers. The monsoon rains in this region are bountiful, providing continuous water supply to rivers. In addition this heavy rain converts the plains into swamps. During monsoons, even commuting becomes difficult in this region. No person perhaps could even imagine, that a country would ever create border disputes with neighbours in such kind of terrain.

 

 

After establishing their power over complete China in 1949, Mao and other Chinese leaders started creating border and other disputes with almost all of Chinese major neighbours. Korean War, Sino-USSR war, border war with India and then war with Vietnam are few examples of this strategy. In autocratically ruled countries, not much importance is given to lives of ordinary citizens or soldiers and they are expandable, when state policy demands so. Chinese leadership under Mao, perhaps never bothered about the manpower losses of the PLA, as long as it served their purpose.

The relations between India and China, appeared to be cordial and friendly till year 1954. Indian Government under Jawaharlal Nehru considered China as a great friend and helped it getting admission into United nations. Nehru and China's premier signed on five principles of peaceful existence known as Panchsheel in this period. Many people think that Nehru did this to brighten his international image. In 1950, PLA invaded Tibet and annexed it. Dalai Lama of Tibet had then made a request for Military assistance to India. Even US and England were more than willing to provide Military help to India, if India was willing to assist Dalai Lama. If India would have accepted this request and gone into Tibet, the scenario over entire Chinese borders would have been totally different today. Unfortunately not only India refused to help Dalai Lama, it also agreed in 1954 that Tibet was a part of China without any quid pro quo. Many historians consider this as one of the disastrous mistakes of the Indian Government for which history would never forgive Nehru. The repercussions of this grave error started showing within next 4 years. In 1954 itself Chinese declared areas near Barahoti as belonging to them. In 1956, China invaded border regions near Tunjun La and Shipki La. In 1958, China started construction of road through Aksaichin region belonging to India and showed in a map published that year, a huge part of Indian territory as belonging to China. The crowning act came in November 1958, when Chinese Government informed India that it does not agree with any border agreements drawn previously and entire Sino-Indian border should be demarcated again.

On 31 March 1959, Tibet's Dalai Lama asked for Political Asylum in India and Indian Government granted it. Within 6 months, Chinese Government unexpectedly declared that they no longer accept the McMahon line between Tibet and NEFA or Arunachal Pradesh as the official border and announced that entire NEFA region belongs to China. This peaceful border suddenly became a disputed one and the border guards of ITBP now faced a major challenge about defending this border.

For many years before this, Chinese army or PLA had been fighting wars somewhere or other. From 1950 to 1951, they had fought in Korea. After this, came the invasion of Tibet. This had made them battle hardened and ready. Chinese armed forces were substantially modernized in this decade with newer and better arms, vehicles and fighter aircraft with the help of Soviet Union. After digging out border disputes with India, Chinese leadership started preparing for inevitable war. New motorable roads or at least such ones by which mules can be taken loaded with ordnance or supplies for soldiers were built by China over entire Tibet-India border. New Depots were created to stock supplies for army. Soldiers were provided with automatic rifles and warm clothing and other equipments for the harsh winter months. As Chinese incurred in further minor skirmishes on the border, the strength of Chinese soldiers was increased. By 1962, there were 18 Battalions (18000 to 20000 fighting men) on NEFA or Arunachal Pradesh border.

India obviously was in the knowledge of these Chinese intentions and actions. Since 1952 the chief of Intelligence,for Indian Government Mr. Malik, was cautioning and warning Government of India on almost continuous basis. Unfortunately Nehru never believed that China would actually invade India on large scale and he was always confident that his peace strategy would be effective. ( It has now come to light from the correspondence that India's then Home minister, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, had been warning Nehru about real Chinese intentions since 1950. Prime minister Nehru apparently preferred to neglect home minister's cautions.) Nehru had appointed in those tumultuous years, an ex bureaucrat, famous for his flaring rage as well as strange and cranky behaviour, Mr. Krishna Menon, as his defense minister. He earnestly believed in local production of arms and ordnance. Credit must be given to him for starting ,many ordnance factories all over India. However, he was a very obstinate person to get along and never really bothered to listen to point of view of others. Because of this reason, Indian army chief, General Thimayya had quit from his post.

It is a bitter truth that Nehru believed that he would be able to solve all international disputes on the strength of his international image as a world leader. Because of this peace doctrine, Indian armed were forces were a neglected lot in the 1950's decade with political leadership turning cold shoulders towards them. There are many example of this, like Army personnel defending the border, not being provided with essential warm clothing for harsh winters or continuing widespread use of 0.303 bore single bolt action Enfield rifles of WW II vintage, when everyone else had shifted to automatic recoil less rifles. Besides this, army was not even provided with suitable vehicles for rapid movement in hilly border areas.

In 1962, after General Thimayya's resignation, General Thapar was made chief of army staff. Eastern command(Which also had jurisdiction over NEFA or Arunachal Pradesh) was led by Lt. Gen L.P. Sen and assisted by Maj.Gen. B.M. Kaul, Maj. Gen. Umrao Singh, Maj. Gen Niranjan Prasad and Brigadier Dalvi, who reported to him. Maj.Gen. B.M. Kaul was comparatively an inexperienced officer, having been promoted out of turn, because of some unknown reasons.

We have already seen above, the geographical situation in NEFA, where a new border dispute was now created by China. This entire region was divided into five parallel districts known as Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, Tyuting and Lohit divisions. For each of these divisions, the geography was similar and included high Himalaya ranges to north, rivers originating there and flowing south and dense jungles and forests in the foothills and valleys towards the south. Tawang was the biggest town in Kameng division. In the eastern division of Lohit, there were tow townships at Kibithu and Walong. Unfortunately no proper roads existed between rail heads in Assam in the south to these towns. Motorable roads existed to certain distance. There were only mule tracks beyond that and in the far north, there were only foot tracks or ways for the men. This was a generalized scene over entire NEFA.

(To be concluded)

20^th October 2012

Run for your lives- Part II

India's northeastern border with Tibet is a natural geographical border formed by a series of snow clad Himalayan peaks. This border can be crossed only through few natural mountain passes or by walking along the foot ways formed adjoining three or four river beds in the basins of these rivers, that cross this natural border. Because of this natural protection and also considering the fact that there was absolutely no border dispute till 1959 between India and Tibet, India had never taken any military steps to safe guard this border. Few border posts near the mountain passes and the river beds were established by India to secure these places. Since there were no roads in this region, most of these frontier posts in the NEFA region were maintained by airdrops of all essential provisions. Till 1959, Assam Rifles policemen were guarding these border posts. 

In August 1959, Chinese attacked Indian position at Longju in Subanseri sector. About 200 to 300 Chinese soldiers attacked the Assam Rifles Policemen guarding this post. There were few policemen guarding this post and they defended this post for 2 day gallantly. After that, they had to withdraw in the interior. In October 1959,  Kongka Pass incident took place. In November 1962, Chinese unilaterally declared that they do not accept Macmohan line as the boundary between India and Tibet. It can be said that attack on Longju post was in a way a precursor to the things to come.